Replicated services accessed via quorurmcnable each access to be performed at only a subset (quorum) of the servers, and achieve consistency across accesses by requiring any two quorums to intersect. Recently, bmasking quorum systems, whose intersections contain at least 2b+l servers, have been proposed to construct replicated services tolerant of barbitrary (B ymntine) server failures. In this paper we consider a hybrid fault model allowing benign failures in addition to the Byzantine ones. We present four novel constructions for bmasking quorum systems in this model, each of which has optimal load (the probability of access of the busiest server) or optimal availability (probabllit y of some quorum surviving failures). To show optimalit y we also prove lower bounds on the load and availabilityy of any bmasking quorum system in this model.
Introduction
Quorum systems are well known tools for increasing the efficiency of replicated services, as well as their availabllit y when servers may fail benignly. A quorum system is a set of subsets (quorums) of servers, every pair of which intersect. Quorum systems enable each client operation to be performed only at a quorum of the servers, while the intersection property makes it possible to preserve consistency among operations at the service.
Quorum systems work well for environments where servers may fail benignly, However, when servers may suffer arbitrary (Byzantine) failures, the intersection property does not suffice for maintaining consist ency; two quorums may intersect in a subset containing faulty servers only, who may deviate arbitrarily and undetectable from their aasigned protocol. Malkhi end Reiter thus introduced masking quorums systems [MR97] , in which each pair of quorums intersects in sufficiently many servers to mask out the behavior of faulty servers. More precisely, a b-maaking quorum system is one in which any two quorums intersect in 2b + 1 servers, which suffices to ensure consistency in the system if at most b servers sufTer Byzantine failures.
In this paper we develop four new constructions for b masking quorum systems. For the first time in this cent ext, we distinguish between masking Byzantine fauks and surviving a possibly larger number of benign faults. Our systems remain available in the face of any~crashes, wherẽ maybe significantly larger than b (such a system is called -resilient). In addition} our constmctions demonstrate optimality (ignoring constants) in two widely accepted measures of quorum systems, namely load and crash probability. The load (C), a measure of best-case performance of the quorum system, is the probability y wit h which the busiest server is accessed under the best possible strategy for accessing quorums. The crash probabllit y (F") is the probabllit y, assuming that each server crashes with probability p, that all quorums in the system will contain at least one crashed server (and thus will be unavailable). The crash probability is en even more refined measure of availab~hy than f, as a good system will tolerate many ftilure configurations with more than f crashes. In proving optimality of our constructions, we prove new lower bounds for the load end crash probabllit y of masking quorum 8ystems.
The techniques for achieving our constructions are of interest in themselves. TWO of the constructions are achieved using a boosting technique, which can transform any regular (i.e., benign fault-tolerant) quorum system into a masking quorum system of an appropriately larger system. Thus, it makes all known quorum construct iom available for Byzantine environments (of appropriate sizes). In the analysis of one of our best systems we employ strong results from percolation theory.
The properties of our quorum systems are summarized in Table 1 . Three of our systems-M-Grid, boost FPP, and M-Path-are the first systems to demonstrate optimal load for bmasking quorum systems. M-Path does so simr.dtaneously with opt imel crash probabllit y for its resilience~, which the fourth (RT) also demonstrates.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. We review related work and preliminary definitions in Sections 2 and 3, respectively. In Section 4 we prove bounds on the load and crash failure probabllit y for bmasking quorum systems and introduce quorum composition. ln Sections 5-7 we describe our new constructions. We conclude in Section 8.
Related work
Our work borrows from extensive prior work in benignly fault-tolerant quorum systems (e.g., [G1f79, Tho79, Mae85, GB85, Hcr86, BG87, ET89, AE91r CAA92, NW94, PW97b] ). The notion of availability we use here (crash probability) is well known in reliability theory [BP75] and has been applied extensively in the analysis of quorum systems (cf. [BG87, PW95, PW97a] and the references therein). The load of a quorum system was first defined and analyzed in [NW94J, which proved a lower bound of fl (~) on the load of any quorum system (and, a fortiori, any masking quorum system) over n servers. In proving load-optimelity of our constructions, we generalize this lower bound to fl (~) for b masking quorum systems.
Grids, which form the basis for our M-Grid constmction, were proposed in [Mae85, CAA92, KRS93, MR97]. The technique of quorum composition, which we use in our RT and boostFPP constructions, has been studied in [MP92, NM92, Nei92] under various names such as "coterie join" and "re-
t Optimal for k-masking systems.
" Optimal for~-resilient syctems.
E.g., a = 0.5 and~s 0.21 for RT(4, 3). 
Preliminaries
We assume a uniuer~e U of servers, IUI = n, over which our quorum systems will be constructed, Servers that obey their specifications are corrsct. A faulty server, however, may deviate from its specification arbitrarily.
We assume that up to b servers may fail arbkrarily and that 4b < n, since this is necessary for a &masking quorum system to exist [MR97] . Beginning in Section 3.2.2, we will also distinguish benign (crash) failures as a particular failure of interest, end in general there may be more than b such failures.
3.1 Quorum systems Definition 3.1 A quorum system Q~2U is a collection of mbaeta of U, each pair of which intersect. Each Q E Q ic alled a quorum.
We use the following notation. The cardinality of the smallest quorum in Q is denoted by c(Q) = min{lQl : Q c Q}. The size of the smallest intersection between any two quorums is denoted by ZS(Q) = min{[Q n RI : Q, R E Q}. The degree of an element i E U in a quorum system Q is the number of quorums that contain i: deg(i) = I{Q E Q : i E Q}l. T is a transversal of Q}.
Regular quorum systems, with 2X(Q) = 1, are insufficient to guarantee consistency in case of Byzantine failures. Reiter [MR97] defined several varieties of quorum systems for Byzantine environments, which are suitable for different types of services. In this paper we focus on ma~king quorum ayatema. 
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Remark:
The resiliency of any quorum system Q is~= MT(Q) -1.
Definition
[MR97]
A quorum sy~tem Q ia a bmesking quorum system if it ia resilient to f > b failures, and obeys the foilowing consistency requirement:
VQl,Q~CQ:lQlnQ212Zb+l.
Remark:
hformally, if we view the service es a shared variable which is updated and read by the clients, then the resiliency requirement of Definition 3.4 ensures that no set of b~f faulty servers will be able to block update operations (e.g., by causing every update transection to abort). The consistency requirement of Definition 3.5 ensures that read operations can mask out any fault y behavior of up to b servers, provided that the algorithm given in [MR97] is used, Lemma 3.8 Let Q be a quorum agntem. Then Q in b-maaking if both the following conditions hold:
ZS(Q)~2b+ 1.
Proof: Assume that Mr( Q) > b+ 1. To see that Q is resilient to b failures, note that if there exists some K such that K n Q # 0 for all Q E Q, then K is a transversal.
By the minimality we have IKI~b+ 1, and we are done. Condition 2 is obvious.
•l Corollary 3,7 Let Q be a quorum system, and let b = min{MT(Q) -l,z~}.
Then Q is b-masking.
Measures
The goal of using quorum systems is to increase the availability of replicated services and decrease their access costs. A natural question is how well any particular quorum system achieves these goals, and moreover, how well it compares with other quorum systems. Several measures will be of interest to us.
Load
A measure of the inherent performance of a quorum system is its load. Naor and Wool define the load of a quorum system as the frequency of accessing the busiest server using the best possible strategy [NW94]. More precisely, given a quorum system Q, an access strategy w is a probability distribution on the elements of Q; i.e.,~Q~Q w(Q) = 1. The value w(~) z O is the frequency of choosing quorum Q when the service is accessed. The load is then defined as follows: Definition 3.6 Let a #trotegy w be given for a quorum system Q = {Ql, . . . . Q~} over a universe U. For an element u~U, the load induced by w on u is l~(u) =~Qiau w(Qi). The load induced by a strategy w on a quorum a~atem Q is G(Q) = maxU~u{lW (u)}. The system load on a quorum sy~tem Q i~L(Q) = minW{& (Q)}, where the minimum is taken over all atrategiea.
We reiterate that the load is a best case definition. The load of the quorum system will be achieved only if an optimal access strategy is used, and only in the case that no failures occur. A strength of this defidtion is that the load is a property of a quomm system, and not of the protocol using it.
Recall that c(Q) denotes the cardinality of the smallest quorum in Q. The following result will be useful to us in the sequel (recall Definition 3.2).
Proposition
[NW94]
Let Q be a fair quorum system. Then L(Q) = c(Q)/n.
Availability
By definition a bmasking quorum system can mask up to b arbitrary (Byzantine) failures. However, such a system may be resiIient to more benign fdures.
By benign failures we mean any failures that render a server unresponsive, which we refer to as craahes to distinguish them from Byzantine failures.
The resiliency f of a quorum system provides one measure of how many crash failures a quorum system is guamnteed to survive, and indeed this measure has been used in the past to differentiate among quorum systems [BG86]. However, it is possible that an f-resilient quorum system, though vulnerable to a few failure configurateions of~+ 1 failures, can survive many contlgurations of more than~failures. One way to measure this property of a quorum system is to assume that each server crashes independcntl y with probabllit y p and then to determine the probability FP that some qumm survives with no faulty members. This is known as crash probability and is formally defined as follows: Definition 3.10 A##ume that each server in the system craahes independently with probabilitpp. For every quorum Q c Q iet &Q be the event that Q is hit, i.e., at least one element i G Q has cmuhed. Let cra#h(Q) be the event that all the quorums Q E Q were hit, i.e., craa h(~) = AQEQ~Q. Then the sy~tem craJh probability is F,(Q) = P(cradL(Q)). 
Building Blocks
In this section, we prove several theorems which will be our basic tools in the sequel. Fh-st we prove lower bounds on the load and availability of &masking quorum systems, against which we measure all our new constructions. Then we prove the properties of a quorum composition technique, which we later use extensively.
The Iocd and availability of masking quorum systems
We begin by establishing a lower bound on the load of b masking quorum systems, thus tightening the lower bound on general quorum systems [NW94] as presented in [MR97]. Proof: Let w be any strategy for the quorum system Q, and fi QI E Q such that IQI I = c(Q). Summing the loads induced by w on all the elements of Ql, and using the fact that any two quorums have at least 2b + 1 elements in common, we obtain:~~(
Q< Therefore, there exists some element in QI that suHers a load of at least~.
IQ, I
Similarly, summing the total load induced by w on all of the elements of the universe, and using the minimality of c(Q), we get: Therefore, there exists some element in U that stiers a load of at least *. El On the other hand, the grid-based construction of [MR97] does not have optimal load. It has quorums of size O(b@) and load of roughly 2b/@. In the sequel we show systems which significantly improve this: some of our new constmctions have quorums of size O(w) and optimal load.
Our next propositions show lower bounds on the crash probability FP in terms of MT(Q) and b. Proof: Let Q E Q be a minimal quorum with IQI = c(Q), and consider Z C Q, 121 = 2b. Since Q is bmasking then lRn Qlz2b+l forany RSQ, andsol(Q\2?)n Rl >1 and Q \ Z is a transversal. Therefore MT(Q) < C(Q) -2b, which we plug into Proposition 4.3.
u The next proposition is less general than Proposition 4.4, however it is applicable for most of our constructions and it gives a much tighter bound. 
Quorum system composition
Quorum system composition is a well known technique for building new systems out of existing components. We compose a quorum system S over another system 7? by replacing each element of S with a distinct copy of ??. In other words, when element i is used in a quorum S E S we replace it with a complete quorum from the i'th copy of 72. Using the terminology of reliabMty theory, the system S o 'R has a modular decomposition where each module is a copy of 7?. Formally: q The load is .C(Q) = C(S) Z(7?).
q
Denote the craah probabilit~functions of S and 7? by s(p) = FP(S) and r(p) = FP(R). Then FP(Q) = 4,(P)).
Figure 1: The multi-grid construction, n = 7 x 7, b = 3, with one quorum Bhaded.
Proof Sketch: The behavior of the combinatorial parameters c(Q),~s(Q) and MT(Q) is obvious. 'The strategy which achieves the optimal load for Q is the following: pick a quorum S E S using the optimal strategy for S. Then for each element i in this S, pick a quorum R; E R-i using the optimal strategy for (the i'th copy of) 72. It is easy to see that the composite strategy is indeed optimal. The behavior of FP(Q) is standard in reliability theory (cf. [BP75]). The multiplicative behavior of the combinatorial parameters in composing quorum systems provides a powerfid tool for "boosting" existing constructions into larger systems with possibly improved characteristics.
Below, we use quorum composition in two cases, and demonstrate that this technique yields improved constructions over their basic building blocks, for appropriately larger system sizes. In particular, in Section 6 we show a composition that allows us to transform any regular quorum construction into a (larger) h masking quorum system.
Simple systems
In this section we show two types of constructions, the multigrid (denoted M-Grid) and the recursive threshold (RT). These systems significantly improve upon the original constructions of [MR97], however both are still suboptimal in some parameter:
M-Grid has optimal load but can mask only up to b = O (@) failures and has poor crash probability; and RT can mask up to b = O(n) failures and has near optimal crash probabilityy, but has suboptimal load.
In Sections 6 and 7 we present systems which are superior to the M-Grid and RT. Nonetheless, we feel that the simplicit y of the M-Grid and RT syst ems, and the fact that they are suitable for very small universe sizes, are what makes them appealing.
A multi-grid
We begin with the M-Grid system, which achieves an optimal load among bmasking quorum systems, where b~(X -1)/2. The idea of the construction is as follows. Arrange the elements in a W x @ grid. A quorum in a multi-grid consists of any choice of~rows and~coiumns, as shown in Figure 1 . Formally, denote the rows and columns of the grid by Ri and Ci, respectively, where 1 S' i < W. Then, the quorum system is 130f41 
Remark:
The load of M-Grid(b) is within a factor of W from the optimal load which can be achieved for b x fi/2.
A disadvantage of the M-Grid system is its poor asymptotic crash probability. If crashes occur with some constant probability p then any conilguration of crashes with at least one crash per row disables the system. Therefore, as shown by [KC91, WO096] ,
Recursive threshold systems
A recursive threshold system RT(k, f) of depth his built by taking a simple building block, which is an t-of-k threshold system (with k > 1 > k/2), and recursively composing it over itself to depth h. In the sequel, we often omit the depth parameter h when it has no effect on the discussion. The RT systems generalize the recursive majority constructions of [MP92], the HQS system of [Kum91] is em RT(3, 2) system, and in fact the threshold system of [MR97] can be viewed as a trivial RT(4b + 1, 3b + 1) system with depth h = 1. As an example throughout this section we will use the RT(4, 3) system, depicted in Figure 2 . In the 3-of-4 example we have 3X(3-of-4) = MT(3-of-4) = 2 and c(3-of-4) = 3. Therefore for the whole system (to depth log, n) we get c(RT(4, 3)) = n]"s's = n0"7s, with ZS(RT(4, 3)) = MT(RT(4, 3)) = W and thus b = (K -1)/2. Note that the basic 3-of-4 system is not even l-masking since intersections of size 2 are too small, however already from h = 2 (i.e., n = 16) we obtain a masking system. Proposition 5.5 The load f,(RT(k, t)) = n-tl-l"cb').
Proof: Since RT(k, t) is fair we carI use Proposition 3.9 to get
In general the load is suboptimal for this construction.
For instance, in the RT(4, 3) system we obtain C(RT(4, 3)) = n-o'zl. However for b = (A -1)/2 we could hope for a load of /_= n-o"as.
Proposition
There ezida a unique critical probability O <p. < 1/2 for which
Proof: Let g(p) be the crash probability function of the l-of-k system and let F'(h) = FP(IW(k, .C)of depth h) denote the crash probability for the RT(k, t) system of depth h. Then F'(h) obeys the recurrence
Now g(p) is a reliability function, and therefore it is "Sshaped" (see [BP75] ). This implies that there exists a unique critical probability O < PC < 1 for which g~e) = PC, SUCh that g(p) < p when p < PC and g(p) > p when p > p. (and [PW95] shows that for quorum systems such es RT in fact p. < 1/2). Therefore if P < P. then repeated aP@catioD of recurrence (1) would decrease F(h) arbitrarily close to O, and when p > pc the limit is 1.p roposition 5.? 1/p < 1/ (4!1) andt < k then~'(RT(k,~)) < e~(-fl(nl"sk(k-l+l) )), which is optimal~or systems with resiliency~= n*Ock(k-i+l).
Proof: Let g(p) and F(h) be as in the proof of Proposition 5.6. Any configuration of at least k -.? + 1 crashes disables the .&of-k system, so
j=k-1+1
By Lemma A.2 (see Appendix)
we have that
9(P)<~_lp -
Plugging this into (1) gives that ()
If p < I/ (1~1) then the last expression decays to zero with h, so FP(RT(k,l)) < exp(-$l(n~"~'tk-~+l))). The lower bound of Proposition 4.3 shows that F'P(RT(k, /))~p"'"gk('-')') , so our analysis is tight.
•l
For the RT(4, 3) s~stem a direct calculation shows that g(p) = 6P2 -BPS + 3P~d P. = 0.Z3ZA. Therefore Proposition 5.6 guarantees that when the element crash probabilityy is in the range p <0.2324 then FP~O when n -+ 00. Fiuthermore, when p < 1/6 then Proposition 5.7 shows that the decay is rapid, with F" (RT(4,  3) ) < (6p) 'i, which is optimal.
6 Boosted finite projective planes
In this section we introduce a family of &masking quorum systems, the boonted finite projective planes, which we denote by boostFPP. A boostFPP system is a composition of a finite projective plane (FPP) over a threshold system (Thresh).
The first component of a boostFPP system ie a finite projective plane of order q (a good reference on FPP's is [Ha186]). It is known that FPP's exist for q = P' when p is prime. Such an FPP has nF = qz + g + 1 elements, and quorums of size c(FPP) = q + 1. This is a regular quorum system, i.e., it has intersections of size ZS ( Proof: boostFPP(q, b) is a fair quorum system since both its components are fair, so by Proposition 3.9 we have
On the other hand, for bmasking systems with n s 4bq2 elements the lower bound of Theorem 4.1 gives Note that the optimality of the load holds for any choice of q and b. Therefore when the number of servers (or elements) increases, the boostFPP(q, b) system can scale up using different policies while maintaining load optimality.
There are two extremal policies:
1. FIX q and increase b; then the system can mask more failures when new servers are added, however the load on the servers does not decrease.
2. FIX b and increase q; then the load decreases when new servers are added, but the number of failures that the system can mask remains unchanged,
It is important to note that systems of arbitrarily high resiliency can be constructed using the first policy since b can be chosen independently of q. In particular, we can choose b = g" for any a >0. Then the resulting system has * Fhmlly we analyze the crash probability of boostFPP. The following proposition chows that boostFPP has good availability as long as p < 1/4. Proof: We start by estimating FP(Thresh).
Let #cmJhed denote the number of crashed elements in a universe of size 4b+l.
Let~=~-p,thus 0<~<1 when p< l/4. Then using the Chernoff bound we obtain
Next we estimate FP(FPP). Let QO E FPP be some quorum. Then
Using Theorem 4.7 we plug (2) into (3) to obtain Fp(boostFPP(q, b)) s (g+l)e-b(l-4p)'12 = e-n(b-'"sq).
u
Remarks:
q In general the crash probability is not optimal; since MT(boostFPP(q, b) ) N bq then the lower bound of Proposition 4.3 shows we could hope for a crash probabilityy of exp (-13(bq) ). Nevertheless if q is constant then F'p is asymptotically optimal, and if b > q then the gap between the upper and lower bounds is small. q The final estimate we get for F" (boostFPP ) seems poor, as the bound is higher than the crash probability of the Thresh components. However this is not an artifact of over-estimates in our analysis. Rather, it is a result of the property that the crash probabilityy of FPP is higher than p, and in fact FP(FPP)~1 as shown by [RST92, WooM] . In this light it is not surprhing that boostFPP does not have an optimal crash probability.
t The requirement p < 1/4 is essential for this system; if p > 1/4 then in fact F'(boostFPP) + 1 as n~00.
The multi-path system
Here we introduce the construction we call the Multi-Path system, denoted by M-Path. The elements of this system are the vertices of a triangulated square A x A grid, and a quorum consists of i= disjoint paths from the left side to the right side of the grid (LR paths) and <~disjoint top-bottom (TB) paths (see F@re 3).
The M-Path system has several characteristics similar to the basic M-Grid system of Section 5, namely an ability to mask b = O(@ failures, and optimal load. Its major advantage is that it also has an optimal crash probabfity F". Moreover, it is the only construction we have for which FP + O as n + cm when the individual crash probability p is arbitrarily close to 1/2. We are able to prove this behavior of FP using results from Percolation theory [Kes82, Gri89] . Remark:
The system we present here is based on a triangular lattice, with elements corresponding to vertices, as in [WB92, Bew96] . We have also constructed a second system which is baaed cm the square lattice with elements corresponding to the edges, as in [NW94] . The properties of this second system are almost identical to those of M-Path, so we omit it. l%aof: Let Q1, Qa E M-Path(b). Then the~~" LR paths of Q1 intersect the~~TB paths of QZ in~2b + 1 elements, since the LR and TB paths are disjoint. As in the M-Grid system we have that MT(M-Path(b)) = @ -+ 1, so when b~6-
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it follows that M'T(M-Path(b))~b + 1 and we are done. for some function @(p') >0. Now~= O(nl" ), so for large enough n we can certainly write F,(M-Path(b)) g exp(-fl(fi -W)). This is optimal by Proposition 4.3.
•!
Conclusion
We have presented four novel constructions of b-masking quorum systems. For the first time in this context, we considered the resiliency of such systems to crash failures in addition to their tolerance of (possibly fewer) Byzantine failures. Each of our constructions is optimal in either its load or its crash probability. Moreover, one of our const~ctions, namely MPaths, is optimal in both measures. Two of our constructions are achieved using a novel boosting technique that makes all known benign fault-tolerant quorum constructions available for Byzantine environments (of appropriate sizes). In proving optimalit y of our constructions, we also contribute lower bounds on the load and crash probability of any bmasking quorum system.
